Prescribed burning has long been recognized as a useful tool in rangeland management, but with it comes the risk of fire and smoke damage to the property of others. All but 2 states have codified laws specifying criminal penalties or liability rules for prescribed burning, but the laws in a number of states have changed in recent years or are under review. We develop an economic model of the incentive and welfare effects of prescribed burning law and regulation in which the likelihood and extent of external damage can be reduced by precautionary effort on the part of both the burner and/or the victim. The model provides implications regarding the comparative advantages to the public of strict liability versus negligence rules. We conclude that the relative effectiveness of a liability rule depends in large part on the relative ability of burners and other landowners to mitigate the probability and extent of damage, as well as the legal costs associated with implementing a given liability rule.
the damage caused by an escaped prescribed fire even if there is no evidence of negligence on their part and regardless of the precautions taken to contain the fire. Most states with prescribed fire statutes impose negligence rules of some form on the prescribed burner, but again, these negligence rules vary substantially across states (Yoder et al. 2003) . Not only do prescribed burning laws vary substantially across states, but these laws currently are in flux. The laws in most states have been revised since 1990, and a number of statutes are currently under review.
We build on a model adapted from the law and economics literature and developed in Yoder et al. 2003 to compare the capacity of the different liability rules to induce the economically appropriate level of precaution by prescribed burners and their neighbors. The intent of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework for assessing the economic efficiency and incentive effects of prescribed burning liability law so that rangeland resource managers can more knowledgeably articulate to policy makers the relative merits of alternative liability statutes.
A Model of Liability for
Prescribed Burning
We will examine 2 neighboring property owners. One neighbor applies prescribed burning to his land, and a neighbor's property would suffer damage if the fire escaped onto his land. Suppose the probability of an escaped fire depends on precaution effort by the burner, and the extent of damage -given that a fire escapesdepends on precautionary effort taken by the victim. The following model is adapted from Brown (1973) and developed for this scenario by Yoder et al (2003) .
First, consider the efficient (wealthmaximizing) levels of precaution; we will then examine the effectiveness of various liability rules for inducing this allocation.
The total net value of a prescribed burn,P, is the value of the benefits from the burn minus the precaution costs and expected A central component of the analysis that follows is "expected damage," defined here as the statistical expectation of damage: P(B) D(V). Notice that if either the probability of damage increases or potential damage increases, then expected damage increases. Examples of V (precaution by the victim) include the use of fire resistant construction materials in buildings and fuel reduction around structures (e.g., defensible space). Examples of B (precaution by the burner) include fire planning, constructing fuel breaks, notifying neighbors and fire officials, and utilizing sufficient manpower. Burning under narrow fire prescriptions, such as highly restrictive windows of air temperature and relative humidity, is an important factor that also can be considered a costly precaution by the burner (Roberts et al. 1999 ).
The economically efficient levels of precaution invested by the burner (B) and the victim (V) are those that maximize H, the total net expected value of a burn.
Assuming that the probability of an escape (P(B)) and damage to the victim (D(V)) decline at a diminishing rate with increases in precaution by the burner and victim (B and V) respectively, the model provides a number of implications regarding the optimal precaution of the burner and the victim. Economic efficiency requires that both the burner and the victim take precautions to reduce potential damage except in special cases. First, if precaution by either the burner or the victim (B or V, respectively) is very costly or ineffective at reducing either the risk of escape (P(B)) or damage to the victim (D(V)), then it may be optimal for one, the other, or even both parties to expend no precautionary effort even when the use of prescribed fire is beneficial to the burner or to society in general (i.e.11(B = 0,V = 0) > 0). Second, if the probability of escape that leads to damage is very low for optimal levels of B (precaution by the burner), then it may be optimal for the victim to expend no precautionary effort. Similarly, if potential damage is very low for even low levels of V (precaution by the victim), then it may be optimal for the burner to take no precautionary effort (see Yoder et al. (2003) for mathematical justification of these results). Implication 2. Strict victim liability is more appropriate when the victim has cost-effective means to reduce expected damage but the burner has no control over the probability of escape.
Burner
Implication 2 simply flips Implication 1 on its head. This result provides an illustration of one of the central arguments of Coase (1960) 
Negligence
With strict burner liability, the burner expects to bear both the costs of precaution and the value of damage to the victim. Now consider a negligence rule such that the burner is not liable for damage if precaution by the burner is greater than or equal to some negligence standard, B. If the burner satisfies the negligence standard (B > B ), he will accrue only his costs of precaution even if the fire were to escape and cause damage.
The second row of Figure 1 illustrates a negligence rule. In panel C, the standard, B, is set to minimize the total expected cost of the prescribed burn, which is the economically efficient negligence standard (that is, B in panel C is equal to B* in panel A). The burner minimizes his costs by exactly satisfying the negligence standard; anything less and he will be found liable, but the burner does not benefit from exerting effort beyond that point. The victim then faces some probability of damage costs and therefore exerts precaution effort V* (panel D). R2 and R1 in panel C represent different levels of benefit to the burner. If R = R2 it is economically efficient to burn and the burner will do so. If R = R1 total expected costs are greater than the benefits, but the burner will perform the burn because he does not expect to bear damage costs.
Given that the burner satisfies the negligence standard, the liability will fall on the victim; thus there is a discontinuity in the burner's cost function at B. Assuming complete information, the victim knows that the burner has an incentive to satisfy the negligence standard, and therefore expects to bear the costs of any damage resulting from an escaped fire. This therefore induces the victim to exert the optimal level of care as well (Fig. 1, panel D) .
An important characteristic of a negligence rule is that the burner will choose to apply precautionary effort at exactly B (Fig. 1 It is possible to set a negligence rule so high that it effectively becomes a strict liability rule. Specifically, if the precautionary costs of reaching B are higher than the expected damage given no precautionary effort, then it would make sense economically for the burner to disregard the negligence standard and simply act as if he faces strict liability. Furthermore, given that the victim is aware of this incentive, the victim will expend no precautionary effort, and the result of an exceedingly high negligence standard is identical to strict liability in terms of both party's precautionary effort.
To burn or not to burn
The results above relate to the allocation of effort given that a prescribed fire is set by the burner. Rules that result in damage being borne by the burner and rules that result in damage being borne by the victim may affect the burner's decision to perform a prescribed fire.
Under a negligence rule, a burner may decide to burn even if total costs outweigh benefits. Figure 1 panel C suggests that a negligence rule may result in too many prescribed fires. R2 represents a level of benefit that, at B, covers both the costs of precaution and expected damage. From an efficiency perspective a prescribed burn should be conducted in this case. In contrast, R1 at B covers the costs of precaution borne by the burner in order to satisfy the negligence rule, so the burn will be conducted. However, because total expected costs (i.e., precaution costs + expected damage) are larger than R1 at B, efficiency dictates that the burn should not be conducted. Thus, a bum will be conducted when it is inefficient to do so if the benefits to the burner lie between the costs of the optimal level of precaution (WbB*) and the total expected costs (P(B)D(V)+WbB*).
For any given distribution of R, this is more likely if the net benefits to the burner are positive but small, and when expected damage is large relative to the precaution costs. Indeed, benefits from a single prescribed burn on rangelands are often small relative to the risk to others (or at least not easily quantified). In contrast, strict liability requires the burner to pay for damage in every case, and therefore is induced to provide efficient precautionary effort and start fires only when the total expected costs are outweighed by the benefits for any given level of precaution by the victim. The victim, on the other hand, has no incentive to expend precautionary effort. If R (the gross value of benefits) falls above the minimum total expected costs given efficient levels of precaution by the burner and victim, but below the minimum total expected costs given no victim effort (V = 0), the burn will not be performed even though it would be efficient to do so given efficient precaution by the victim. This case is shown in Figure 2 with R = R3. As shown in the figure, under strict liability, V = 0. Total expected damage, and total expected costs (TC) for the burner are therefore higher for any level of B than the efficient level resulting from V = V*. If the benefits of the burn fall between the minima of these 2 cost curves (e.g., R3), a fire will not be set even though it would be set if the victim were performing precautionary effort. It follows from this discus- Recall that the negligence rule discussed previously imposes a standard on the amount of precaution, B, given that a fire is performed, and that this standard is in principle chosen based on the costs and benefits of precautionary effort. For purposes of comparison, call this an "inputbased" negligence standard; it imposes no restriction or requirement on whether a fire should be performed in the first place. A second negligence rule could be based on the total net expected social value of conducting a burn. Call this a "valuebased" negligence rule. It requires a burner to be found negligent if he conducts a burn when the expected total net benefits (including expected damage) are negative (Feldman and Frost 1998 (Tietenberg 2000 be able to extract excessive compensation, burners will be "too careful" from an efficiency perspective. As Cooter (1991) notes, this type of error will have more pronounced effects on the level of care under a strict liability rule because the effects will be felt every time litigation is brought, whereas under a negligence rule misspecified damages only matter when the burner is found negligent. Perfectly specified negligence standards lead to efficient effort for any prescribed fire, but misspecified negligence standards will result in inefficient precaution by both parties. Consider Figure 1 again. Because the burner minimizes his expected costs at exactly B (or B = 0 if B is set extremely high), the burner's behavior will be highly responsive to a consistently misspecified negligence rule. On the other hand, if the legal standard is vague and applied inconsistently by the courts, a negligence rule is likely to induce either too much or too little precautionary effort on the part of the burner even if the standard is on average applied correctly (Kolstad et al. 1990, Cooter and Ulen 1988 and it is not cost-effective for potential victims to reduce potential property damage from fires (implication 1). In the U.S., 22 states explicitly impose negligence rules and only 4 impose strict liability on burners (Yoder et al. 2003 
Specificity of negligence rules
Statutory rules relating to prescribed fire often contain an ambiguous statement requiring "due care", as well as more specific rules that are necessary (but not sufficient) to satisfy due care. The economic logic behind one common specific rule, the requirement to notify neighbors, is as follows. If landowners expect to be notified of their neighbor's intentions of prescribed burning, they need only be on alert for an escaped prescribed fire when such a fire is planned (and reported). This undoubtedly lowers their overall precaution costs, because time-sensitive precautionary effort (clearing dry vegetation near a house that might contribute to the extent of damage, for example) may then be performed only when the potential for an escaped prescribed fire exists, and need not be applied at other times. Furthermore, the cost to a burner of notifying adjacent landowners is likely to be relatively low. As a result, notification of neighbors will reduce the overall expected costs of a prescribed burn. Of course, the threat of wildfire still exists, but this probability is separate from that of prescribed burns from neighbors. It should be noted that not all precautionary effort need be time-specific. For example, using fire-resistant building materials does not necessarily require timely notification. It would also be possible for a notification requirement to extend beyond adjacent landowners. However, notifying nearby landowners is not costless, and the potential gains from prior notification are likely to be lower because landowners further away will most likely have more time to react to the news of an escaped fire. Also, the probability of a fire crossing an adjacent landholding and onto landholdings further away are lower, so the expected costs to distant landowners are lower.
Thus, the expected net benefits from a notification requirement for distant landholdings is not as compelling. Indeed, no landowner notification requirements extend to non-adjacent landowners.
Notification requirements to non-adjacent landowners could be justified in some situations. For example, in some states small land holdings are common and fire spread is sufficiently rapid that non-adjacent landowners might not have time to react.
In some states, a burner must notify a related regulatory agency before burning in order to escape potential criminal penalties or civil liability. Colorado statutes state that a person who starts a fire is not liable for the expenses of extinguishing an escaped fire if he notifies the sheriff of the time and place of the burn. To the extent that prior notification reduces the cost or increases the effectiveness of public firefighting effort, this negligence requirement does so at only a small cost to the burner (a telephone call, perhaps).
Another common specific requirement among state statues is that burners must remain with the fire until it is completely extinguished (i.e., "dead out"). On one hand, the cost to a landowner (or the landowner's agent) for remaining an additional hour or day on a burn site is likely to be relatively low compared to the expected costs of an escape from an unattended smoldering fire. The crucial point here that leads to such a requirement is that without such a negligence standard, the costs of a burner leaving a site prematurely would likely be borne at least to some extent by a neighboring landowner rather than the burner. But this is yet another example of an incomplete contract in that specifying every indicator of "dead out" fires would be impossible. Moreover, the "dead out" requirement assumes low cost to the burner when in some cases, practicality in assessing "due care" in regard to attaining this standard would result in high cost to the burner. This is especially true on rangelands in which large burns, complex fuel involvement, rough topography, and other factors, limit the burner's ability to completely and accurately assess the fire's status.
Moreover, the probability of fire escape may be very low. The specifics of the level of certainty of "safe-to-leave" decisions (i.e., mopping up including thorough "cold trailing") are not well defined in the rangeland fire literature and are beyond the scope of this paper.
Specific negligence rules for cost-effective inputs such as notification and on-site presence are consistent with implication 7, because it is unlikely that the costs of such precautions will outweigh their expected benefits (i.e. reductions in expected damage). Even though limitations to their costeffectiveness exist, statutory specification of these rules will provide a higher degree of certainty about negligence requirements, thereby more effectively inducing proper precautionary incentives and reduce transaction costs of court proceedings.
The productivity and costs of many precautionary inputs, however, depend on the specific circumstances of a case. Attempts to impose a priori statutory requirements for input levels may lead to improperly specified negligence rules for many cases, and therefore should on efficiency grounds be left for a case-by-case analysis. Indeed, all statutory negligence standards for prescribed fire allow the courts the leeway to define "due care" (implication 7). Yoder et al. (2003) , we provide a conceptual framework for improving existing policy at a time when prescribed burning policy is in a state of flux.
The risk of fire escaping to neighboring landholdings always accompanies the use of prescribed fire, and burners therefore may not bear all of the potential costs of their prescribed burning decisions.
Criminal and civil liability rules specified by legislation and enforced by the courts work to internalize these costs. The relative effectiveness of a liability rule depends in large part on the relative ability of burners and other landowners to mitigate the probability and extent of damage, as well as the transaction costs associated with implementing a given liability rule.
All negligence rules rely on an ambiguous requirement of due care that is left to be defined more specifically by the courts, but many states include specific negligence standards as well. Most of the recent changes in statutory law relating to prescribed fire provide substantial support for prescribed fire as a land management tool despite the risks associated with its use. These changes may result more from the increasing evidence that prescribed fire can be a cost-effective means of reducing the incidence and intensity of wildfires. Literature Cited
